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The WHO Global Code of Practice –  
A Useful Guide for Recruiting Health 
Care Professionals? 
Lessons from Germany and Beyond 
Steffen Angenendt, Michael Clemens, and Meiko Merda 
Like many rapidly aging countries Germany is experiencing an increasing lack of 
health care professionals. There is growing interest also in recruiting health care 
personnel in developing countries, alongside concerns about potential effects of that 
recruitment on health overseas. In this process, the German government – like many 
other governments of industrialized countries – has been guided by the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) 2010 “Global Code of Practice”. But this Code has turned out to 
be inconsistent: on one hand the WHO recommends not recruiting health workers 
from some countries, while on the other hand guaranteeing their freedom of mobility. 
To cope with this contradiction, many governments of receiving countries rely on 
a 2006 WHO list of 57 states with a “critical shortage” of health professionals. That list 
was constructed using inherently poor and outdated data, and a country’s inclusion on 
the list required numerous debatable judgment calls. How can industrialized countries 
meet their increasing demand of health care personnel while avoiding negative devel-
opment outcomes? 
 
Like most other OECD countries, Germany 
is already experiencing a shortage of quali-
fied health care personnel. This shortage is 
only expected to grow. Rising life expectan-
cy and falling birth rates will nearly double 
the old-age dependency ratio (the propor-
tion of those above 65 years of age and the 
working force) by 2060. According to offi-
cial data, the number of the most elderly 
will increase from 4.1 to 9.0 million, fuel-
ling an additional demand in Germany of 
150,000 to 180,000 skilled nurses by 2025. 
The German government has developed 
a strategy to better exploit the domestic 
labor force by increasing the participation 
rate of women, the elderly, and younger 
people. Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
these shortages cannot be filled by domes-
tic means only, and that Germany will 
have to foster immigration to meet the 
increasing labor demand. This has been 
acknowledged in a strategy recently 
adopted by the Government (Fachkräfte-
strategie). 
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 It is also reflected in the newly-reformed 
legal framework for migration – with re-
percussions for health care personnel. The 
introduction of the “Blue Card” in 2012 
reduced barriers for the migration of for-
eign physicians and other high skilled per-
sonnel to Germany. The July 2013 reform 
of the Employment Regulations (Beschäfti-
gungsverordnung) allowed the German 
Federal Labor Market Authority (Bundes-
agentur für Arbeit) to define jobs especially 
affected by workforce shortages. In these 
sectors, including medium-skill workers 
such as nurses, migration will be facilitat-
ed. According to the OECD, Germany has 
become one of the member states with the 
least legal obstacles for the immigration 
of high qualified employees – although 
working migration is in international com-
parison still low. 
In addition, the German government has 
initiated pilot projects to study the design 
of migration schemes for the health care 
sector. So far, the main focus of these initia-
tives is to reduce the health worker shortage. 
But the pilot projects are also intended to 
have development impacts on the sending 
countries. The guiding idea is that properly 
managed migration in the health care sec-
tor can have a positive impact not only on 
the country of destination, but also for the 
migrants and their home country (“Triple 
Win”). Nevertheless, it is certainly true that 
migration can also have several negative 
side-effects. Migration is costly and many 
migrants are vulnerable due to the lack of 
information, money or institutional sup-
port. Furthermore, all else being equal and 
in the short run, emigration reduces the 
labor supply in countries of origin. There-
fore, the emigration of health care profes-
sionals from less-developed countries with 
low domestic stocks of nurses and doctors 
has often been equated with “brain drain” – 
a permanent loss of high qualified person-
nel to industrialized countries. 
To avoid such negative implications for 
developing countries, the World Health 
Organization has adopted a “Global Code of 
Practice on the International Recruitment 
of Health Personnel”. The Code is intended 
to serve as a normative basis for the devel-
opment and implementation of well-man-
aged migration schemes. 
Shifting migration patterns 
Health worker migration is neither a new 
phenomenon nor a new topic in global 
diplomacy. But since the 1950s the size 
and structure of this type of migration has 
profoundly changed. 
The immigration of health care person-
nel from developing to industrial countries 
has accelerated since the 1970s. In the 
middle of the 1970s, 6% of all physicians 
and 5% of all nurses worldwide were em-
ployed abroad; in 2000 it was 18% of all 
physicians in OECD-countries and 11% of 
all nurses. Germany is increasingly com-
peting for health care professionals – with 
countries like USA or the United Kingdom, 
where salaries are high, language barriers 
are low and where several possibilities for 
further personnel or professional develop-
ment exist. 
By 2010, the share of physicians from 
developing countries in the UK has risen 
to 37%, with almost half of these trained in 
India or Africa. In 2007, the OECD estimat-
ed that while their home countries struggle 
with serious health workforce shortages, 
over half the potential physician workforce 
of Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Tan-
zania, and the Caribbean countries (with 
exception of the Fiji) worked in OECD coun-
tries. 
To cope with these challenges, countries 
of origin initially tried to restrict emigra-
tion, for example through withholding 
degree certificates or travel documents or 
through other compulsive measures. But 
given the limited success of such strategies, 
the focus has since shifted towards bilateral 
or multilateral management of flows. Now 
the emphasis is more on development 
aspects and migrant’s rights, and finally on 
the idea that migration can yield mutual 
benefit. There is growing discussion of the 
potential for a “triple win” – with benefits 
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 for sending and receiving countries as well 
as for the migrants themselves. 
Principles of the WHO Code 
Against the background of the escalating 
demand of skilled health workers in middle 
and high income countries and a growing 
awareness of the risks of increasing out-
flows from poorer countries, the World 
Health Assembly asked the WHO in 2004 
to develop a common code of conduct for 
health personnel. This process was also 
driven in part by the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and a generally growing awareness of the 
importance of multilateral policies and 
global governance. 
In May 2010, the WHO member states 
adopted the “Global Code of Practice on 
the International Recruitment of Health 
Personnel”, which stated that health care 
migration should benefit the health sys-
tems of both source and destination coun-
tries. Stating that the migration of health 
personnel “can make a sound contribution 
to the development and strengthening of 
health systems, if recruitment is properly 
managed”, the Code defined basic princi-
ples for future bilateral and international 
cooperation on health care migration. 
The Code urges member states to address 
present and expected shortages in their 
health personnel and create a sustainable 
health workforce. It recommends effective 
human resource planning, education, and 
training, and developing retention strat-
egies that will reduce their need to recruit 
migrant health personnel. In addition, it 
recommends that international recruit-
ment of health personnel be conducted in 
accordance with principles of transparency, 
fairness, and sustainability of health sys-
tems in developing countries, and should 
be designed to mitigate the negative effects 
of health personnel migration on the 
health systems of developing countries and 
safeguard the rights of health personnel. 
Generally, member states adhering to the 
Code should promote and respect fair labor 
practices for all health personnel, and they 
should facilitate circular migration of 
health personnel, so that skills and knowl-
edge can be achieved to the benefit of both 
source and destination countries. 
In this respect, the Code encourages 
member states to 
 seek out partnerships with countries of 
origin, 
 make commitments with relevant stake-
holders (e. g. recruiters, healthcare facil-
ities), 
 provide technical and financial assis-
tance, 
 foster planning, training, education, and 
retention measures, 
 incorporate the WHO Code of Practice 
into national law and policies, 
 collect more reliable evidence on health 
personnel migration, and 
 facilitate the exchange of information by 
up-to-date databases. 
Contradictions and Shortcomings 
Despite its balanced approach, the Code 
contains several contradictions that make 
implementation difficult. 
The first and most important contradic-
tion is embedded in Articles 3 and 5, com-
monly interpreted as the core of the Code: 
Article 3.4 affirms that the principle of 
freedom of movement should also be valid 
for health care personnel, noting that 
“nothing in this Code should be interpreted 
as limiting the freedom of health person-
nel, in accordance with applicable laws, to 
migrate to countries that wish to admit and 
employ them”. Notwithstanding this prin-
ciple, Article 5.1 stipulates that “Member 
States should discourage active recruitment 
of health personnel from developing coun-
tries facing critical shortages of health 
workers.” 
It is difficult to reconcile these principles 
in practice. Either restrictions on recruit-
ment do not end up restricting health 
worker’ mobility, in which case they cannot 
effect health systems in migrant-origin coun-
tries, or they do end up restricting mobility, 
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 in which case they violate the specific 
exclusion of limits on mobility. Advocates 
of the Code argue that “active recruitment” 
makes the difference – and that the degree 
of the involvement of the receiving govern-
ment is decisive for the question if or if 
not a government is violating the Code. In 
contrast, critics argue that is extremely 
difficult to assess the degree of an “active 
recruitment” of public agencies. In addi-
tion, they mention that the role of private 
recruiters and of public private partner-
ships (PPP) is not mentioned, and that 
therefore the Code’s approach is – due to 
the lack of conceptual clarity – unrealistic, 
paving the way for arbitrary interpretation. 
The “critical shortage” 
A second important shortcoming of the 
Code is the definition of “critical shortages”. 
Governments require a definition of “criti-
cal shortage” if they are to implement the 
Code. The definition of “critical shortage” 
that underlies the Code, however, reveals 
that governments cannot rely only on the 
WHO definition of “critical shortage” when 
assessing the effects and ethics of a specific 
recruitment act. Governments always and 
everywhere must make their own good-
faith assessment of whether or not a given 
act of recruitment contributes to the 
shortage. 
The WHO defines a country to be in 
“critical shortage” of health workers when 
it meets both of two separate conditions. 
These are: 1) the sum of employed doctors, 
nurses, and midwives is equal to or less 
than 2.28 per 1,000 population, and 2) fewer 
than 80% of births are attended by skilled 
health personnel. The WHO’s flagship World 
Health Report of 2006 determined that 57 
countries were in “critical shortage”. The 
threshold density of 2.28 health workers 
per thousand population arises from a 
simple calculation. First, it estimates the 
positive relationship, on average across all 
countries, between health worker density 
and the percentage of births attended by 
skilled health personnel. Second, it selects 
a minimal acceptable level of skilled birth 
attendance: 80% of births. Finally, it finds 
that the average relationship between health 
worker density and skilled birth attendance 
crosses the 80% skilled birth attendance 
level at a health worker density that, with 
95% statistical confidence, lies between 2.02 
and 2.54. The middle of that range is 2.28. 
This definition of a “critical shortage”, 
however, has several problems that limit 
its practical use for planning a recruitment 
relationship with any given country. 
 The true value of any threshold in health 
worker density is uncertain. Assuming that 
this threshold exists, the WHO’s underlying 
analysis only finds that it lies somewhere 
within the range of 2.02 and 2.54 health 
workers per thousand population. In the 
data of the same WHO analysis, 14 coun-
tries lie within this uncertainty interval. 
This is one quarter of the number of coun-
tries deemed to be in “critical shortage”. 
The underlying statistics do not permit 
a confident statement about whether 
the threshold includes or excludes these 
countries. 
 There is no medical basis for any universal 
threshold of 80% coverage. The WHO bases 
its health worker density threshold on a 
“minimum desired level” of 80% skilled 
birth attendance. That figure originates in 
a paper in the medical journal The Lancet 
which chooses that level as an arbitrary 
round number to summarize the data in 
one of its figures. There is no change at or 
near 80% in that study’s data that would 
justify the choice of that particular num-
ber. The 80% number does not arise from 
a medical investigation of whether it is 
optimal for any given country to deploy 
human resources for health in a different 
way, such as for other types of primary care 
or for tertiary care. For example, a country 
that has achieved basic coverage in birth 
attendance can lack personnel for other 
tasks, and a country that has not achieved 
basic coverage in birth attendance can have 
adequate personnel for other tasks. The 
choice of 80% skilled birth attendance is 
an arbitrary round number for one type of 
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 care, but the definition of “critical short-
age” is highly sensitive to this choice. 
Varying the “minimum desired level” of 
skilled birth attendance between 70% and 
90%, for example – two other equally plau-
sible, round numbers – would alter the 
“shortage” classification of 31 countries. 
 The true number of health workers is 
uncertain. The method used to count health 
workers differs from country to country. 
The WHO uses four different types of data 
sources to estimate of the number of health 
workers in a country. Many of these sources 
define health workers differently and all 
have different margins of error. They only 
include people working as health workers, 
which can miss large numbers of workers. 
For example, at the same time that the 
WHO determined Kenya to have a “critical 
shortage” of nurses, Kenya had a surplus of 
at least five thousand nurses that could not 
find employment as nurses and thus were 
not included in health worker density 
estimates. Most of the WHO estimates are 
also greatly outdated. For 106 of the coun-
tries where the WHO counted health 
workers, estimates reflected conditions in 
2002 or before – that is, eight years before 
the Code of Practice was adopted. 
 There is no mechanical relationship 
between health worker density and skilled 
birth attendance. There are ten countries 
that fall below the WHO health worker 
density threshold and nevertheless fall 
above the skilled birth attendance thresh-
old. Conversely, there are eight countries 
that are above the health worker density 
threshold but below the skilled birth attend-
ance threshold. In the WHO’s data, Laos 
and Chile have almost the same health 
worker density (1.61 and 1.72 respectively) 
but vastly different skilled birth attendance 
(Laos 19%, Chile 100%). This makes it clear 
that raising skilled birth attendance is no-
where close to a simple function of raising 
the number of health workers within a 
country’s borders. In other words, WHO 
data demonstrate that even large additions 
to the health workforce per se need not 
remove a country from “critical shortage”. 
 There is currently no scientific evidence 
that limits on recruitment have affected 
staffing levels or health outcomes in 
migrant-origin countries. Fifteen years 
ago, the United Kingdom began banning 
National Health Service from active recruit-
ment of health professionals from certain 
countries deemed to have health worker 
shortages. Neither that policy nor related 
policies in other countries have ever been 
shown to have caused a measurable in-
crease in health worker staffing, the level 
or quality of health care, or population-
level health outcomes in migrant-origin 
countries. 
The researchers who created these statis-
tics understand all of the above caveats. 
When the creators of the WHO method 
used it to arrive at a similar density thresh-
old of 2.5 health workers per 1,000, they 
noted that the method relies on numerous 
debatable assumptions and noisy, often 
outdated data. Explaining the large devia-
tions from a mechanical relationship 
between health worker density and health 
service delivery, they write, 
“Why the deviations? Because of the 
confounding effects of other social factors, 
such as education and economics, and of 
the way countries mobilize and deploy 
workers not classified under existing inter-
national systems. So, the density of 2.5 
workers per 1,000 is a suggestive guideline, 
not a definitive benchmark.” 
The World Health Organization agrees 
that these numbers are not sufficient to 
define a shortage: 
“These estimates … are not a substitute 
for specific country assessments of suffi-
ciency, nor do they detract from the fact 
that the effect of increasing the number of 
health workers depends crucially on other 
determinants such as levels of income and 
education in the community. Furthermore, 
economic factors also enter the equation: 
shortfalls based on need can co-exist with 
unemployment of health workers due to 
local market conditions.” 
That is, both the researchers who estab-
lished the shortage criteria and the WHO 
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 agree that placement of a country on the 
“critical shortage” can and should only 
be interpreted as a “suggestive guideline” 
and is “not a substitute for specific country 
assessments” of the effect of a particular 
recruitment act in context. Countries vary 
enormously in how recruitment affects the 
size of the health workforce, how size of 
the health workforce affects service delivery, 
and how service delivery affects health out-
comes. These contextual features are not 
captured by the “critical shortage” list, in 
the opinion of the list’s own creators. 
Interpretation and implementation 
of the Code 
German policies for managed migration 
have been designed around the WHO Code. 
Recently, several recruitment schemes were 
implemented or are prepared in the health-
care and education sector: 
 Vietnam: The Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) funds a 
project to educate approximately 100 
nurses from Vietnam in old-age care (from 
autumn 2013). The nurses learned German 
language at the Goethe Institute of Hanoi, 
to level A2 of the Common European Frame-
work of Reference for Languages. They 
arrived in Germany in late 2013 for train-
ing in old-age care for 2 years in four fed-
eral states, preparing for employment 
in geriatric care. 
 China: The German employer association 
in the nursing sector (Arbeitgeberverband 
Pflege) is preparing, with the support of the 
German Federal Labor Market Authority, 
a project to employ Chinese nurses in hos-
pitals and care facilities. The project will 
begin in 2014. 
 Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco: Asklepios, with 
the financial support of the Federal For-
eign Office, has been training 25 nurses 
from Tunisia since 2013. Further projects 
with Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco are plan-
ned within the framework of the “trans-
formation partnerships” which encourage 
collaborations between Germany and coun-
tries of Northern Africa/the Middle East. 
 The Philippines, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
Tunisia: In March 2013, the Federal Employ-
ment Agency and the Philippines conclud-
ed a bilateral agreement to facilitate the 
placement of Filipino nurses in Germany. 
GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit) plans to use this and other 
government-to-government agreements 
with Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Philip-
pines, and Tunisia to recruit two thousand 
nurses. 
 EU countries: In the last one and a half 
years, the Federal Government has reached 
several agreements with South European 
countries to (1) extend Germany’s dual 
vocational system and to (2) facilitate mo-
bility to Germany to reduce youth unem-
ployment in source countries, especially 
Spain. 
These pilot projects pave the way for the 
management of future migration schemes 
in the nursing sector and are in line with 
several principles of the Global Code of 
Practice. However, receiving countries put 
the main focus on the needs of their own 
labor markets, and thus on the reduction 
of the domestic manpower shortage in the 
healthcare sector. Concrete measures to 
strengthen the capacities in countries of 
origin, like technical or financial aid or 
incentives for return and circular migra-
tion, have not been implemented so far. 
Nevertheless, source countries have shown 
keen interest in collaborative agreements 
because indirect development outcomes are 
to be expected by the emigration of nurses. 
These include: 
 Positive effects on labor markets: High-popu-
lous countries like the Philippines or Viet-
nam participate in the pilot projects to cre-
ate new employment opportunities abroad 
for the increasing working-age population. 
When unemployment rates are high or there 
is an oversupply of domestic nurses in 
source countries, pressure on labor markets 
will be abated by emigration. 
 Migration-induced knowledge transfer: Source 
countries expect returning migrant profes-
sionals to bring knowledge and experience 
from industrialized countries to health sys-
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 tems back home, such as in the care and 
supervision of people with dementia and 
other psychogeriatric disorders. Even if 
migrants stay permanently abroad, they 
might establish business partnerships with 
their home countries. 
 Remittances: Many migrant nurses send 
substantial amounts of money home. These 
flows increase consumption, investment 
and entrepreneurial activity and con-
sequently strengthen the economies of 
migrant-origin countries. 
If migration schemes are managed well, 
such positive development effects are likely 
to occur in any country of origin with high 
and rising working-age population. In these 
countries, often characterized by poor job 
opportunities and low wage levels, attrac-
tive migration options have the potential to 
increase the stock of domestic profession-
als. In India, for example, many nurses 
acquired their training in part because a 
nursing degree offers better possibilities to 
migrate to developed countries, but large 
numbers nevertheless remain in India. In 
a non-representative survey in India, 62% 
of Indian nurses, nursing students, and 
nursing teachers agreed that the oppor-
tunity to migrate influenced their decision 
to choose nursing education. 
But the development potential of mobili-
ty partnerships in the health sector has 
been largely ignored. Instead, the German 
government strictly follows the WHO 2006 
definition of a “critical shortage” despite 
its many limitations. This is reflected in 
the legal framework for the migration of 
skilled professionals to Germany. In gen-
eral, the migration of nurses is rated as 
“acceptable” by the German Federal Labor 
Market Authority. As a consequence, nurses 
from Non-EU countries get admission to the 
German labor market when their degree 
from abroad is accredited by the German 
authorities in charge. However, there is 
one exception: The “direct recruitment” of 
nurses from countries of origin that fall 
below the threshold is still prohibited out-
right. The regulation does not allow for the 
“specific country assessments of sufficien-
cy” specifically recommended by the WHO, 
assessments for which the shortage list “is 
not a substitute”. In practice, this means 
that there is little to no political support 
for bilateral partnerships in the healthcare 
sector with these countries; the critical 
threshold is treated as an all-or-nothing 
criterion. This criterion killed an effort to 
create a migration and training partnership 
between Germany and India in 2011. Despite 
the fact that the partnership was specifical-
ly designed to result in more nurses in India, 
the German government cited the presence 
of India on the WHO shortage list and was 
unwilling to consider participation. 
Recommendations 
The 2010 WHO Code of Practice must be 
considered a step forward towards a fair 
and balanced global approach for manag-
ing international health care migration. 
Nevertheless, the contradictions and short-
comings analyzed in this paper constitute 
serious obstacles to a full implementation 
of the Code. 
The notion of “critical shortages”, in 
particular, requires revision. This would 
include a much more precise and compre-
hensive approach to identify such short-
ages, based on criteria reflecting more 
adequately the health care situation and 
the general economic and social conditions 
in the country of origin. One of the main 
deficits so far has been the idea of basing 
the decision of recruiting or non-recruiting 
of health care workers on fixed thresholds 
of health-worker density. Such simple nu-
meric thresholds are misleading, because 
they do not assess the health care situation 
in the country of origin properly. While 
the WHO agrees that the thresholds are not 
adequate to settle the ethics of recruitment, 
it is responsible for discouraging its mem-
ber countries from misinterpreting and 
misusing the Code. 
Some of the contradictions of the Code 
could be overcome by interpreting the com-
peting principles in a more pragmatic way. 
In particular, it would be wise for receiving 
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 and sending countries to attach more 
importance to the often overlooked prin-
ciple in Article 5.1 that “the health systems 
of both source and destination countries 
should derive benefits from the inter-
national migration of health personnel.” 
This principle would be a good criterion 
for developing rules and regulations for 
mutually beneficial health care migration, 
and provide a guideline for designing proj-
ects and programs for a fair and develop-
ment-sensitive health care migration. 
Two policy options should be consid-
ered more in depth: temporary and circular 
migration schemes and transnational train-
ing partnerships. 
Temporary and circular migration 
Temporary and circular (repeated tempo-
rary) migration schemes are highly attrac-
tive for policy makers and the public, both 
in general and in the health sector par-
ticularly. Such arrangements hold the 
promise of meeting diverse policy goals: 
filling labor shortages to provide employers 
with more flexibility, and at the same time 
mitigating any effects on health worker 
stocks at the origin. In addition, it is 
expected that these health care migrants 
would send substantial remittances home, 
complementing official development aid. 
Nevertheless, a critical question is to 
what degree such programs depend on a 
strict implementation of rules and regu-
lations, especially obligations to return, 
and how policy should address migrants 
who decide not to return. Indeed, recent 
experience with circular migration schemes 
indicates that a substantial number of such 
migrants return home, but that a certain 
number find ways to stay permanently in 
the host country. If governments intend 
to develop such programs, they should be 
aware that it requires substantial political 
and administrative involvement as well 
as certain flexibility with regard to return 
migration. In addition, temporary and cir-
cular migration programs must be tailored 
to skill levels. 
Transnational training partnerships 
A largely unexplored way for countries to 
unlock the development potential of health 
worker migration is to form bilateral part-
nerships linking health worker mobility 
to health worker training. When public or 
private entities in destination countries 
directly support training of future migrant 
professionals, in the countries of origin, 
there are many benefits. Such arrangements 
could raise human capital stocks at the 
origin to offset losses, finance training to 
eliminate fiscal drain from migration of 
publicly-subsidized trainees, and build up 
world-class training institutions in origin 
countries. 
Partnerships of this kind, if well-
designed, could also benefit countries of 
destination: their involvement with the 
training process at the origin would allow 
them to tailor the training migrants receive, 
as well as save money, given that technical 
training is often much less expensive in 
countries of origin even at equivalent qual-
ity. And partnerships of this kind would 
benefit migrants as well, ensuring their 
smooth transition to, and proper prepara-
tion for, jobs at the destination. 
Generally, temporary and circular migra-
tion schemes as well as innovative training 
partnerships would do much to implement 
the WHO Code’s prescription that “the 
health systems of both source and destina-
tion countries should derive benefits from 
the international migration of health per-
sonnel.” But innovation of this kind is pre-
vented when the Code is misinterpreted as 
unconditionally banning recruitment from 
many developing countries, since all such 
initiatives would involve recruitment. 
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